As global LNG buyers and investors look beyond the current wave of supply additions from the US Gulf and Qatar, a clear divergence has emerged between two long-contested Pacific basin LNG export projects.
As global LNG buyers and investors look beyond the current wave of supply additions from the US Gulf and Qatar, a clear divergence has emerged between two long-contested Pacific basin LNG export projects.
According to the Global LNG Database®, Shell-led LNG Canada's proposed Phase 2 expansion is on track for a Q1 2031 startup with active pre-FID development.
Alaska LNG, by contrast, has no FERC permit, no major sponsor, no FID, and no planned start date. The gap is not narrow. It is absolute.
On permit status, LNG Canada Phase 1 is already operational, meaning Phase 2 requires only routine permit amendments.
Alaska LNG has no FERC authorization.
On economics, LNG Canada achieves a breakeven of US$8-9/MMBTU, while Alaska LNG requires US$11-13/MMBTU.
Alaska LNG's apparent viability at today's crisis-driven JKM prices evaporates once conflict in the Persian Gulf resolves and prices revert to forecasted sub-$12/MMBTU levels by 2027, exposing the project's fatal dependence on a temporary disruption rather than sustainable market fundamentals.
On sponsor strength, LNG Canada brings together five majors - Shell, PETRONAS, Mitsubishi, KOGAS, and CNPC - with pre-FID funding already approved.
Alaska LNG has no major equity partner.
On political support, the contrast is revealing yet ultimately irrelevant to project viability. Canada's federal and British Columbia governments have provided consistent, enabling support for LNG Canada - streamlined permitting, infrastructure coordination, and First Nations engagement - without attempting to replace private sector leadership.
The US government, by contrast, has offered heavy political endorsements and potential federal loan guarantees for Alaska LNG over multiple administrations. Yet even this significant political backing cannot change the fundamental reality: no amount of federal support can substitute for the commercial discipline, balance sheet, and execution track record that a major private sector sponsor provides. Political will is a complement to a viable project, not a replacement for one.
On technical risk, LNG Canada leverages an existing 670-kilometer pipeline.
Alaska LNG requires an unpermitted 1,300-kilometer greenfield pipeline across permafrost with a four-month annual construction season.
On carbon and ESG, LNG Canada delivers an estimated 0.25-0.35 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of LNG using BC Hydro's renewable grid.
Alaska LNG would emit 0.45-0.55 tonnes from gas-fired power, making it less attractive to Asian buyers who increasingly prioritize lower-carbon supply.
As conclusion, Alaska LNG as currently structured is not a competing project. It is a concept that requires complete redesign before it can be taken seriously.
For investors, offtake buyers, and policymakers, LNG Canada Phase 2 is the credible, bankable, lower-carbon choice - and by a wide margin.
This post is an abstract of the insightful report prepared by Global LNG Info Analytics for clients of our
Consulting Service.
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